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Functionality of Radicalization: A Case Study of Hizb ut-Tahrir
Abstract
Moving beyond the concern with causes of radicalization, this article explores the
transformative aspect of radicalization within Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party). The
personal narratives obtained from this ethnographic fieldwork are placed into a frame of
reference related to how radicalization occurs within Hizb ut-Tahrir. Gaining insight into
this social phenomenon required an ‘ethnographic’ approach, which allowed me to study
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in their natural setting. My access to Hizb ut-Tahrir put me in
the unique position of being able to gather the biographical information required to study
radicalization. In essence, I sought to acquire, from within the group setting, an
understanding of how members become indoctrinated within Hizb ut-Tahrir. As the findings
reveal, Hizb ut-Tahrir radicalization is a narrow cognitive process that has distinct
behavioural outcomes.
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Introduction
Radical Islam remains a fringe ideology within the United Kingdom, yet its
attractiveness continues to grow amongst some younger Muslim
practitioners. In Britain, the rise of radical Islam has been spearhead by
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a vocal radical Islamist group that has been active in
the UK for over 30 years. Since the group’s arrival in the UK, its
ideological agenda has centered on recruiting young people. The
demographic makeup of UK membership illustrates this youth bulge, as 85
per cent of members are below the age of 30 and 96.3 per cent were
recruited before the age of 25.1
The age composition of HT membership is not unexpected, as countless
popular movements attract young activists.2 However, the focus is not to
determine why some young British Muslims join HT, but rather to
understand the method of radicalization within HT. It is difficult to
pinpoint exactly how HT indoctrinates some young Muslims within its
organization, because it operates in a clandestine manner. As a result,
trying to gain close proximity to HT radicals is an incredibly complicated
task. After lengthy negotiations with senior HT officials, I gained access to
observe the organizational structure of HT. I witnessed first-hand the
transformative consequence of HT radicalization, as young novices
gradually adopted the ideology of HT.

History of Hizb ut-Tahrir
Hizb ut-Tahrir came into existence over half a century ago in the West
Bank. The founder of HT, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, witnessed the
establishment of a Jewish homeland in the heart of his birthplace.
Decades before, he witnessed the West rampage through the Muslim
world, solidifying non-Muslim supremacy. He was disgusted with the
hegemony of Western culture, which he blamed for weakening the Muslim
world.3 Western culture played a key role in evoking HTs ideological
awakening. According to al-Nabhani, the only way to neutralize the
dominance of Western culture was to enact HT ideology.4 Hizb ut-Tahrir
ideology is a divine doctrine from which a system emanates.

Wali, F., Radicalism Unveiled (Farnham: Ashgate Publishers, 2013), 116.
Engel, S.M., The Unfinished Revolution: Social Movement Theory and the Gay and
Lesbian Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 39.
3 Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Islamic State (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2002a),
4.
4 Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Al-Takattul al-Hizbi (The Party Structure) (London: AlKhilafah Publications, 2002b), 13.
1
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In its practical formation, HT ideology is fashioned from the Islamic
legislative sources, which generate a host of solutions to temporal and
metaphysical problems. According to HT, there are three distinct state
ideologies: “Democratic secularism, communism, and the Islamic
system.”5 The goal of HT is to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey
it to the whole of humanity.
We know little about how this clandestine movement operates, in terms of
its structure and recruitment, but since its conception in the Middle East,
it has progressively sought to expand. It is surprising how little attention
this group has received in the academic literature. As a result, HT’s
activities have gone largely unnoticed, allowing them to establish a
popular base of support among some young Muslims in Britain.

Methodology
During my initial encounters with HT members, I noticed that, on the
surface, they appeared thoroughly, as evidenced by their dress, language,
and leisure activities. However, these young men had become radicalized
by HT ideology, turning against liberal and secular values. I wanted to
find out what processes contributed to this change. The work of fellow
researchers appeared to be characterized by their fascination for
radicalization, from a distance.6 A major reason for this neglect has been
the difficulty in collecting primary data as Islamist groups operate in a
clandestine manner.7
This begs the question, how does one study HT? To begin, what
distinguishes this research from other scholarly work is the ethnographic
approach. In 2009, I started my fieldwork by attending local HT activities.
After spending several months interacting with new recruits and members,
I started to observe the Halaqah (private study circle). In total, I had
access to three separate Halaqah’s, consisting of 22 novices and four HT
members. The fieldwork lasted for 12 months, and within this time, I
gained insight into the inner workings of HT radicalization. In particular,
the techniques they employ to indoctrinate new activists. Adopting an
ethnographic approach gave me an opportunity to study the activities of
group members in their natural surroundings.8
Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Nidham al-Islam (The System of Islam) (London: AlKhilafah Publications, 2002c), 24.
6 For example: Roy, 2002; Crayton, 1983; Crenshaw, 1981; Jenkins, 1979; Post, 1990).
7 Academics have recently turned to ex-members, as a means to understand the
radicalization process. In Radicalism Unveiled, I outline the methodological
problems with referring to autobiographical accounts of ex-members (such asEd
Husain). Refer to Wali, F., Radicalism Unveiled.
8 Garfinkel, H., “Re-specification: Evidence for locally produced, naturally
accountable phenomena of order, logic, reason, meaning, method,” in G. Button
5
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The approach used to acquire data from my participants relied extensively
on a large network of contacts within HT. This enabled me to capture the
opinions of the members, allowing me to articulate their views related to
the radicalization process. This provided me with insight, as a participant,
of the inner workings of the organizational structure. This, furthermore,
made my fieldwork easier because I was not considered an outsider, and
was given open access to members and to HT culture. However, during
the course of my fieldwork, I grew increasingly concerned with the
problem of ‘selective perception.’9 In other words, as Ray explains, if one
studies a single process extensively, then representativeness of the sample
may be compromised.10 In order to counteract this potential problem, I
observed three separate Halaqah’s, enabling me to experience the same
social phenomenon with different novices.
In addition to the ethnographic work, I conducted a series of in-depth
interviews with HT novices and members. In order to understand how HT
radicalized early recruits required conducting interviews with Farid
Kassim and Omar Bakri Muhammad, as they were the founders of the UK
branch in the early 1980s.11 These interviews revealed how the first study
cells formed, providing insight into the purpose and strategy of HT
radicalization. As the men disclosed, the techniques they developed for
indoctrinating young novices formed the wider strategy for HT Britain,
which has been in effect for over three decades.

Radicalization
Before commencing this study, I felt somewhat confident that once I
gained inner access to HT, at the operational level, I would easily be able
to locate instances of radicalization. Instead, as I acquired access, I found
it extremely difficult to isolate specific techniques constituting
‘radicalization.’ So, it became apparent I had to obtain clarity concerning
what I meant when I claimed members of HT had been ‘indoctrinated’. I
felt the best way to do this would be to generate abstract comparisons with
other behavioral processes such as ‘brainwashing’ and ‘conditioning’.
Wilson makes an interesting distinction between the two based on

(ed.), Ethnomethology and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991).
9 Ray, William, Methods Toward a Science of Behavior and Experience (Wadsworth,
CENGAGE Learning, 2009), 297.
10 Ibid.
11 The interviews with Farid Kassim and Omar Bakri were conducted in 2004 as part
of my research into the history of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK. Refer to: Wali, F.,
Radicalism Unveiled.

104
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 1

dichotomizing belief and behavior.12 This would imply radicalization fits
together with beliefs, while conditioning relates to behavioral process. In
simple terms, ‘we condition people to do something; we indoctrinate them
to believe something’.13 This distinction is quite apt for HT radicalization,
as novices freely join HT and actively agree to undergo radicalization.
Therefore, as will be revealed, radicalization within HT is a group activity
lead by the indoctrinator, which takes place in the Halaqah (private study
circle). It is the indoctrinator’s primary function to inculcate his novices
with the correct ideological belief system. Therefore, radicalization occurs
within the Halaqah, while behavioral modification and conditioning
occurs outside of the Halaqah.

The Difficulty of Explaining the Radicalization Process
Radicalization, as a process, is not easily explained. There are many
different ways of framing the subject of radicalization, a good starting
point is social psychology. This is because social psychology, as can be
inferred from its description, combines the ways in which both social and
mental processes determine identity.14 Radicalization, in a social
psychology context, refers to a considerable departure from traditional
ideals, constituting a full and real change at the root of the personality.15
This definition offers a good starting point, but this definition needs to be
amended because it is incomplete and far too general in its scope and
application. For instance, the same definition of radicalization could be
given to those who undergo a religious conversion. According to Rambo,
there are two transformations that are central to the conversion process:
“total change in all other aspects of life, and a new awareness of the wellbeing of others.”16 In general, the act of religious conversion might have a
similar result to radicalization, but these two forms of identity change are
not identical.
Despite accumulating a vast array of new data regarding HT members and
their backgrounds, it is still extremely difficult to pinpoint precisely how
radicalization occurs, since radicalization is a ‘complex process that does
not follow a linear path’.17 The immediate concern here is to provide a
John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality” in Concepts of indoctrination:
philosophical essays (New York: Routledge, 1972), 17-18
13 Snook, I. A., Concepts of indoctrination: philosophical essays (New York:
Routledge, 1972), 2.
14 Rom, H. and Lamb, R., The Dictionary of Personality and Social Psychology
(eds.), (MIT Press, 1986).
15 Popplestone, J. A. and McPherson, M. W., Dictionary of Concepts in General
Psychology (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).
16 Lewis Rambo, “Religious Conversion,” in Encyclopedia of Religion (New York:
Macmillan, 1987), 77.
17 Pargeter, A., “North African Immigrants in Europe and Political Violence,” Studies
on Conflict and Terrorism 29: 737.
12
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definition of radicalization before any serious study of the topic can be
made. Firstly, I prefer to use the idiom HT radicalization, instead of more
generic terms like radicalization. This is because from social constructivist
theory, ‘framing’ of radicalization draws upon a collective phenomenon
that is essentially contextualized to two key agents: the group and the
novice.18 Thus, the definition of HT radicalization crafted in this article
can be separated into three distinct parts: (1) a new cognitive perspective
is engineered based on HT ideology that is (2) internalized, so (3) the
Hizbi personality can be created (collective group identity).19

Hizb ut-Tahrir Ideology: Engineering Cognitive Change
The most fundamental part of identity transformation in HT is the deep
process of radicalization, which provides a new cognitive perspective with
which to view the social world. At this point, I want to look briefly at
cognitive theory, in order to clarify its meaning in the context of
radicalization. Social cognitive theory defines behavior as a reciprocal
interaction between an internal emotional state and triggers that are
available in the environment.20 Social psychologists have long tried to
identify the key cognitive and motivational changes that occur within
individuals when they become group members. The radical group is the
primary setting for the creation of a new cognitive perspective, because
members are willing to ‘bend towards group expectation’.21 This
explanation shows the strong interplay between individuals and groups,
enabling HT to change the cognitive perspective of members. Wiktorowicz
in her study of Al-Muhajiroun, now disbanded, discovered contact with
the radical group often required a ‘cognitive opening’.22 This cognitive
opening is a gateway to the wholesale transformation of previously held
beliefs. According to Wiktorowicz, this is often inspired by identity crisis,
which renders the recipient more susceptible to radical ideology. Thus,
early fascination with the radical group often leads to a ‘cognitive opening’,
activating a process of ‘religious seeking’.23 The triggers for this opening
are multifaceted and greatly hinge on the experiences of the individual,
making them vulnerable to the movement.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Wordon, and Robert D.
Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51: 464-81.
19 Wali, F. Radicalism Unveiled, 44.
20 Bandura, Albert, Social Learning Theory (New York: General Learning Press,
1977).
21 Newcomb, T.M. and Swanson, G.E., Readings in social psychology (ed.) (New
York: Rinehart and Winston, 1953), 221.
22 Wiktorowicz, Q., Radical Islam Rising: Muslim extremism in the West, (Oxford:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 19.
23 Ibid.
18
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This view of cognitive change in perception within a group setting involves
members privately and publicly adopting this as their own choice.24 As a
result, individuals are categorized, and placed in an in-group. This
membership is then internalized by members as an aspect of their
identity.25 In this respect, the basis for a member’s self-definition changes
within the group, allowing his or her personal identity to be submerged
into a collective identity.26 According to Triplett, moving from a state of
social exclusion to a group setting can drastically diminish one’s sense of
individuality.27 Similarly, Newcomb found that increased interaction with
other members prompts individuals to change their attitudes in
accordance with the group consensuses.28 In other words, for the
cognitive transformation to take effect the individual must align his
viewpoint with HT ideology.

Internalization and Creating the Hizbi Personality
Internalization is a general term for the process of incorporating concepts
and behaviors into one’s self, and embedding features of the external
world into the internal world.29 This internal world is strongly influenced
by group involvement, actively imposing constraints on behavior and
reshaping the external world. In other words, when a novice joins HT, his
or her perceptions of others change in accordance with HT’s perceptions,
allowing him or her to internalize the collective HT ideology. This
internalization of ideas and beliefs actively occurs through the culturing
process, which completely alters the disposition and creates group loyalty.
This transformative phase is integral to HT radicalization, as it infuses the
individual to the group.
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a significant actor in the development of a new cognitive
and behavioral disposition, especially as it is the sole interpreter of the
radical ideology. Within the group setting, the novice is indoctrinated into
thinking in accordance with the group perspective. This is manifested in a
new way of viewing the social world, which may contradict established

Appelbaum, R. P., Carr, D., Duneir, M., Giddens, A. “Conformity, Deviance, and
Crime,” in Introduction to Sociology (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company,
2009).
25 Tajfel, H., Human Groups and Social Categories (Studies in Social Psychology
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
26 Post, Jerrold M. “The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behaviour,” International
Journal of Group Psychotherapy 36:2 (1986).
27 Triplett, Norman, “The dynamogenic factors in peace making and competition,”
American Journal of Psychology 9 (1898).
28 Newcomb, T.M. and Swanson, G.E., Readings in social psychology (ed.) (New
York: Rinehart and Winston, 1953).
29 Meissner, W. W., Internalization in Psychoanalysis (New York: International
Universities Press, 1981).
24
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convention.30 Thus, the first significant aspect of HT radicalization relates
to the establishment of a new cognitive perspective that reflects the group
identity. According to Sherif and Sherif, the group setting has a powerful
influence on individual behavior, justifying the ‘in-group’s negative
opinions of the out-group’.31 Similarly, David and Turner argue, in a
group setting people tend to ‘depersonalize’ and ‘stereotype’ themselves
and other people.32 Consequently, HT members focus more on the
similarities between themselves, which makes it easier to impose
differences between them and the ‘others’. More importantly, the new
cognitive perspective, gained in a group environment, spawns greater selfesteem and empowerment.33 Empowerment is an essential part of the
radicalization process, increasing the ideological strength of individuals;
the empowered develop a greater sense of confidence in their own
abilities. In the context of HT, for example, the member must ‘adopt the
opinions of the group, its thoughts, and its constitution by word and
deed’.34 This means that anyone who becomes a member of HT has to
pledge an oath to adopt everything HT calls for even if he or she is not
convinced of some of it.35 Taken as a whole, the theory of HT
radicalization will encompass individual and collective life, identifying the
shifting patterns of behavior that take place at the root of a personality.

Before Radicalization: Targeting the Disaffected
Omar Bakri, former leader of HT Britain, argued that young British
Muslims struggled to contend with their identity. This perpetuated two
completely opposing personalities, which he dubbed, the “Bobby and
Abdullah syndrome.” At home, the ‘Abdullah persona’ would revert to an
ethnic association, speaking the language of his parents and adhering to
their custom. However, outside the home the ‘Bobby persona’ would
materialize. As Bakri declared, “he would drink, go clubbing, and be fully
integrated [British culture].”36 This apparent ‘clash of cultures’, during the
early stages of socialization, would be key to HT radicalization. The
engineering of radicals required finding young people that had become

Hassan, Steven, Releasing the Bonds: Empowering People to Think for Themselves
(Aitan Publishing Company, 2001)
31 Sherif, M., and Sherif, C. W., Social Psychology (Int. Rev. Ed.) (New York: Harper
and Row, 1969).
32 David, B., & Turner, J. C., “Studies in self-categorization and minority conversion:
The ingroup minority in intragroup and intergroup contexts,” British Journal of
Social Psychology 38 (1999).
33 Tajfel, H & Turner, J. C., “An Integrative theory of inter-group conflict,” in W. G.
Austin and S. Worchel, The social psychology of inter-group relations (Monterey,
CA: Brooks, 1979).
34 Al-Nabhani, Taqi al-Din, Hizb ut-Tahrir (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1998),
1.
35 Ibid, 2.
36 Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
30
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disaffected, during their socialization, because these individuals displayed
greater motivation towards HT ideology. If socialization were an integral
aspect of personality development, shaping and informing identity, then
what effect would adverse socialization have? According to Bakri, the
issue of racism Passive voice to target those young people that had
experienced this in their childhood utilizing the psychological pain; they
felt, as a means to radicalize them in adulthood. By exploiting a key
developmental stage HT were able to redirect a recruit’s negative feelings
to a radical treatment.
Those young Muslims that had suffered through their socialization
developed dysfunctional identity structures that lead to a proclivity for
greater belonging. HT recruits developed through the life cycle struggling
to adjust their identity, lacking the ability to control their surroundings,
which perpetuated a deep feeling of frustration. The early recruits, in one
way or another, all experienced some form of social difficulty that marred
their socialization. The research presented in this article suggests the HT
elite sought to establish radical cells, comprising almost exclusively of
young Muslims. To facilitate this process, the founding members
methodically targeted ethnic minorities, arousing a sense of conflict with
the dominant culture. This would be achieved by exploiting the dual
aspect of socialization received by minority groups. Bakri explained how
the experiences of young Muslims being racially attacked, in the cases he
observed, caused them to be “distrustful of Kuffar (non-Muslims).”37

Radicalizing the Novice: The Halaqah system
Members of HT believe their organization is distinct, because it is
seemingly regulated by detailed protocols that have been codified into a
set of adopted rules. These protocols allow HT leadership to allocate tasks
at every level, but in actuality, it limits the novices from rationalizing
activity. Omar Bakri claimed he built all the cells and placed the new
recruits into the Halaqah, which is a private study group comprising of
one member and five novices.38 The systematic radicalization of the
novice occurred in the Halaqah, as it helped solidify core beliefs and
established dependency on HT. The Halaqah became the static point of
radicalization, as it placed the novice within a closed setting that removed
them from external anchor, allowing inculcation of HT ideology. Before
entering the Halaqah, the novice has an established set of ideas related to
society and life, forming the ideological point of reference for their
existence. However, when placed in the Halaqah with other novices, the
ideological point of reference fragments as the HT member engineers a
37
38

Ibid.
Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
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new ideological viewpoint. As Wilson asserts, implanting beliefs through
authoritative figures can replace reason, making it a form of illegitimate
radicalization.39
When I began observing the Halaqah process, I was concerned that my
presence may unintentionally distort its normal function. However, as
time passed, I gradually gained acceptance, allowing me to observe the
Halaqah in its natural environment. By observing the Halaqah in its
everyday setting, I was able to experience the cognitive and behavioral
changes experienced by novices over a 12-month period. Initially, I
attributed this change to brainwashing and conditioning. However, this
according to Winn would suggest that the novices were ‘unaware’ of the
Halaqah purpose.40 Yet, as observed, novices join the Halaqah process
willingly. As AQ (novice) declared, “the H [Halaqah] removes ideological
contamination and builds the correct ideological foundation.”41 This
suggests novices acknowledge the transformative agenda of the
Halaqah.42
As Lifton discovered, brainwashing is not an all-powerful transformative
method that can achieve “total control over the human mind.”43 This
suggests brainwashing may not be an appropriate description of the
Halaqah process, because as Farid explained, “we’re not creating mindless
automatons…we want ideologues.”44 The Halaqah is the location where
novices are ideologically reformatted, having their thoughts and behavior
realigned to HT ideology. Brainwashing may seek a similar outcome, but
it employs a range of persuasive techniques as Lifton’s study of Chinse
communists revealed.45 In this regard, radicalization as a descriptive
measure fits the aims and method of the Halaqah, as HT radicalization
centers on the novice’s ideological framework.
In the early 1980s, Omar Bakri conducted the first UK Halaqah’s,
culturing the first generation of HT recruits. In the Halaqah, Omar Bakri
went about transforming the novice, in a holistic fashion, rendering them
with a Hizbi personality. This would entail attaching the thoughts and

John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality” in Concepts of indoctrination:
philosophical essays (New York: Routledge, 1972), 14-17.
40 Winn, D., The Manipulated Mind: Brainwashing, Conditioning, and
Indoctrination (Malor Books, 2012), 4.
41 AQ made these comments during a group discussion held on April 7, 2009.
42 This article does not report the psychological reactions novices had to the Halaqah,
as the goal was to understand the mechanics of the radicalization process. In follow up
articles, we will provide insight into the psychological impact of the Halaqah process.
43 Lifton, Robert J., Thought reform and the psychology of totalism: a study of
Brainwashing in China (The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 4.
44 Farid Kassim, recorded interview, June 26, 2004.
45 Lifton, Robert J. Thought reform and the psychology of totalism.
39
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ideas to specific modes of behavior, as to generate a change, which
apparently “developed a deep and profound way of thinking.”46 The
Halaqah process became the central mechanism to sustain the purity of
HT ideology by dispersing the ideology throughout the party cells. Omar
Bakri recounting how he established the Halaqah system in the early
1980s stated the Halaqah enabled him to mobilize HT into active cells,
which through constant replication gave birth to newer cells across the
country.47
Omar Bakri assigned great importance to the Halaqah process, bestowing
serious attention to its precise undertaking. The Halaqah had one
primary function to indoctrinate the novice in a concentrated manner.
The Halaqah was used to indoctrinate the novice with a shared belief
system, forming a single unit of members, embodying HT ideology.
According to Farid Kassim, senior member of HT, the Halaqah focused on
developing the ‘aqlya’ (mentality) and the ‘nafsyya’ (disposition) of the
novice.48 The process of constructing the ‘nafsyya’ (disposition) among
the novices was essential, because HT activity was dependent on the
commitment of its new members. Omar Bakri believed the ‘nafsyya’
would determine the ‘level of sacrifice and commitment’ members
allocated to the party cause.49 Omar Bakri was the main Mushrif
(instructor) of the early recruits, regulating the Halaqah and assuming full
responsibility for its supervision. The Halaqah was configured in a way
that made it differ entirely from the academic and philosophical styles of
teaching. According to Omar Bakri, the academic style had been rejected
as a means of disseminating HT ideology because it detracted the novice
from HT’s ideological aim and it did not “build Islamic personalities.”50
Importantly, the numbers admitted into the Halaqah, by Bakri, was
deliberately restricted and organized broadly around the same level. Bakri
claimed the academic style “lacks productivity.”51 For instance, he felt
culturing novices in large classes prevented the Mushrif from tailoring HT
ideology to the varying strengths and levels of each novice.

The Structuring of the Halaqah:
The Halaqah has received special consideration in HT literature, as it is
the main device used to engineer the Hizbi personality. According to
Omar Bakri, “if the Halaqah was organized in an incorrect manner” then

Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
Ibid.
48 Farid Kassim, recorded interview, June 26, 2004.
49 Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
46
47
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the culturing process would decline.52 Thus, he formulated a
comprehensive set of preventive procedures that would safeguard the
Halaqah process. First, the preliminary stage of acceptance would be used
to maintain the integrity of the Halaqah, Bakri explained. In this respect,
four standard guidelines would be used to establish in the novice a general
awareness of the party culture, which a prospective novice had to obtain as
a perquisite for entry into the Halaqah. At this stage of entry, HT makes a
crucial distinction between acquiring a general awareness and that of
conviction; the latter is only procured after a deep process of radicalization
through many years of study within the Halaqah. In contrast, a general
awareness entails a basic acceptance that these auxiliary thoughts are
correct and require action.
For this purpose, Bakri developed four entry-level guidelines that had to
be fulfilled to gain admittance to the Halaqah, which is designed to extend
beyond energetic zeal. First, to consolidate, a novice must accept Islam as
a complete way of life that addresses all temporal and spiritual problems.
Second, the need to abide by the Hukm Shari (Islamic law) in all remits of
life must be demonstrated, especially related to the establishment of the
Khilafah (Islamic State). Third, the novice must agree that the work to
establish the Khilafah is a political action. Finally, admittance cannot take
place until the novice acknowledges HT as the only Islamic party correctly
working to establish Islam. The novice prior to admittance into the
Halaqah must agree on these four areas.
The preliminary discussions with the novice would usually take place
through individual contact or in small public circles, commonly referred to
as an intermediate Halaqah. The intermediate Halaqah, Farid explained,
would consist of “three or four circles addressing each of the guidelines.”
Omar Bakri made it clear to the new recruits they had consented to ‘work’
for HT. This was important, as Farid explained, because HT strongly
discourages the use of the term ‘study’. Rather, ‘emphasis was given to
work’, as HT does not invite people for scholarly study, instead they seek
ideological activists who will energetically work to establish the objectives
of HT.53 According to HT, Islam is a religious and political ideology,
within which sovereignty belongs exclusively to God. This means human
agents do not have the mandate to govern, making man-made ideological
systems invalided. This is why HT rejects participation within the political
system, and thus requires the recruitment of activists willing to operate
outside of the system.
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The new recruits on their admission to HT were explained two further
issues by Omar Bakri. First, the work to establish Khilafah required clear
ideas about Islam. According to HT, Islam is a divine doctrine from which
a complete system of human governance emanates. This ideological
interpretation seeks the holistic enforcement of the Islamic legislative
system in society (e.g. enactment of Sharia Law), as Islam is the only
source of worldly guidance. Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology view’s Islam as a
complete system of human governance, deciphering all human problems
(e.g. political, economic, social, and ethical). This makes it mandatory for
human beings to implement the ideology of Islam. In order to acquire this
ideological understanding of Islam necessitated committing to studying
these ideas within the Halaqah system.
Second, the novice must attend the Halaqah regularly, being punctual and
committing themselves to two hours a week: non-compliance is haram
(sinful act).
The Halaqah has been ordained with special administrative consideration,
as it implants the ideology within the novice. This means its regulation
must be conducted in a strict and consistent manner. For this reason, the
Mushrif assumes direct responsibility for the supervision of the Halaqah.
The Mushrif, for example, must submit a detailed Halaqah report to the
Masool (area supervisor) after every Halaqah informing him of the
progression of each novice. Within this report, the Mushrif documents
tardiness. If a novice is late on a regular basis, then the Masool will take
action. As Omar Bakri explained, ‘lateness cannot be tolerated’, because it
reduces the importance of HT’s work.54
The Halaqah has distinct stylistic rules. The Halaqah should be given in a
manner that influences the novice to initiate thinking and feeling. The
Halaqah facilitates the novice to construct his or her own views rationally
and freely. This suggests radicalization is an ‘intentional activity’.55
However, this ignores the Mushrif, who is the indoctrinator. The Mushrif
guides the novice to arrive at the correctness of HT ideology, but this
should not occur through blind obedience. The Mushrif assumes full
responsibility for explaining the content of HT ideology, which is
proceeded by a discussion on the concepts raised to gain clarity.
Importantly, HT enforced strict guidelines on the Mushrif, for instance, he
alone could answer questions, without exception, as the credibility of the
Mushrif would be brought into question if a particular novice answered
questions on his behalf. Hizb ut-Tahrir administrative law had gone to
Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
John Wilson, “Indoctrination and Rationality,” in Concepts of indoctrination:
philosophical essays (New York: Routledge, 1972), 18.
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meticulous depths to explain every minute detail related to the Halaqah.
According to Farid, detailed guidelines had even been documented about
the mannerisms of the Mushrif, especially when delivering a Halaqah:
“The Mushrif should be quiet and soft spoken, and control his nerves
during questions, discussion, and explanation and be cautious not to get
angry or agitated.”56 Hizb ut-Tahrir has given the Halaqah the highest
seriousness, as it indoctrinates novices.

Beginning a New Halaqah
Omar Bakri asserted each Halaqah was given significant attention, during
the development of the early Halaqahs, especially concerning their
preparation and administration. In this respect, Omar Bakri requested all
Mushrif’s to act like a “father figure to the novice,” guiding and fostering
the burden of the novice’s development.57 The Halaqah built the Hizbi
personality. This ideological remolding starts with changing the cognitive
perspective, which entails removing the remnants of the old ideological
viewpoint. The novice grew up in a secular environment, exposed to an
array of non-Islamic standards. The western ideological viewpoint became
the basis for action. For this reason, the first phase of Halaqah was
assigned to studying the book Nidham al-Islam (system of Islam). In
particular, the first chapter deals with belief, while the second confronts
the topic of fate and destiny. These two chapters were used to establish a
new ideological framework that would motivate the novice, by altering his
entire outlook. The intellectual subject matter of the Halaqah helped
cultivate a sense of collective radicalization.58 In contrast to peer
discussions, the Halaqah drilled ideological content into the novice. As
one member explained: “Halaqah is a building process…corrupt concepts
are destroyed and the correct concepts built.”59 This suggests the goal of
the Halaqah is to radicalize the individual. I need to stress the HT
activists I spoke to all objected to my use of the term radicalization, as they
collectively felt it implied a lack of rationality. According to Crenshaw,
radicalization can be generated through rational and non-rational
methods.60 In the Halaqah, the Mushrif rigidly regulates the discussion,
making the Halaqah a contrived social space.

Secondary Radicalization: Pursuance
In the early 1980s, the first Halaqahs were designed to change the
sentiments and inclinations of the novice because, as Omar Bakri
Farid Kassim, recorded interview, June 26, 2004.
Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
58 Cited in Wali, F., Radicalism Unveiled, 106.
59 Ibid.
60Crenshaw, Martha, “The Psychology of Political Terrorism,” in Margaret Hermann
(ed) Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985).
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explained, “they were brought up in a corrupt western society.”61
However, Omar Bakri realized the Halaqah was a short medium, as it is
conducted once a week for two hours. To build a conceptual framework in
a clear and precise manner required substantial ‘pursuance outside of the
Halaqah. Pursuance entailed following the novice outside of the Halaqah
in a natural way, to see whether they had assimilated the concepts of the
Halaqah into their daily life. According to Omar Bakri, the Mushrif would
visit the novice ‘in his home or take him to the Mosque’, bringing him
closer to the novice.62 At this early stage, converts to Islam were treated
differently, as Mushrif’s were required to give more time to them, because
they had to be taught the fundamentals of religious belief. Through the
Halaqah Omar Bakri sought to create an environment of ‘spirit’ that
connected the novice to God, via HT. The new members were key to this
pure environment; they had to lead by example. Therefore, the Mushrif
was sanctioned with the duty to consolidate his Halaqah into a unified
cell. In this respect, the process of radicalization occurred within the peer
group setting.
In order to understand pursuance, I was able to observe the interplay
between Mushrif and novice outside of the Halaqah. In essence, novices
formed closed peer group bonds, which reinforced HT ideology. As Nina
(novice) said, ‘practicing was hard early on because you’d be told what to
do and how to do it’.63 This interface seems disproportionate, as the
behavioral norms within the peer group are regulated by HT ideology. In
addition, pursuance developed close relationships with amongst the
novices and the Mushrif, making radicalization easier. As Sara explained:
“I really trusted the sisters; we became close and I revealed a lot to them
about myself.”64 Familiarity within peer groups cultivates ideological
socialization.65 Peer socialization was an important developmental stage
in the pursuance process, as it gives the novice a framework to view and
interact with the social world. The novices I observed seemed fully
engaged within the peer group, creating a strong attachment to HT. As
one novice observed, “we’d do data (spread HT ideology) and then we’d
chill…there is a collective spirt we have.” As with all group dynamics, the
peer group indoctrinated a deep sense of group identification among the
novices. In sum, the novice sought identification with the peer group for
the following reasons: (1) membership provided benefit; (2) it offered
distinctiveness from other social groups; (3) there was a sense of common
experience.66
Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
Omar Bakri Muhammad, recorded interview, March 26, 2004.
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When an individual joins HT, they are deliberately engineered towards
conformity. This pressure is exhibited, in the first instance, by assuming
the role of novice. This initial stage of interaction with HT gradually
brings their behavior into alignment with the norms of HT. Most
importantly, HT exploits the need to belong within the novice, providing
him or her with a feeling of self-importance by conveying a new cognitive
worldview. As the radicalization process deepens, the novice is gradually
conditioned to accept the moral supremacy of HT ideology. This is clear
from the comments made by Farid, concerning the need for the individual
to embody HT ideology in all aspects of his or her life, as he states:
“The power of the ideology attracted us to the party, and
I felt that power when I used to visit other people’s
circles and meetings. You just felt this incredible
confidence, not arrogance, but confidence. The truth is
arrogant, so you feel this power and that’s never gone
away from me, twenty years plus now.”67
This view indicates how the individual grows to depend on HT, inspiring
loyalty and long-term commitment. Shaw makes a similar assessment of
membership in a terrorist organization, as the group “often provides a
solution to the pressing personal needs” that is not achieved in the wider
society.68 This offers the individual a new identity and a role in society,
albeit a negative one, which in a passive sense imposes conformity. This is
equally true for members of HT, as they cannot envisage life outside of HT.

Conclusion
The 1980s marked a pivotal period in the development of HT, as they
deliberately targeted the Muslim youth. It was on these grounds we
decided to approach the question of how HT radicalization functions. I
have discovered HT radicalization to be a narrow and distinct psychosocial
phenomenon with identifiable patterns related to controlling an
individual’s behavior. Radicalization is not simply an individualistic
process; rather, it is embedded in a group context that exerts influence
over the individual.
Hizb ut-Tahrir indoctrinates the novice with a distinct ideological
worldview, shaping how the novice perceives and interacts with the social
world. The inculcation of HT ideology occurs in the closed group setting of
Farid Kassim, recorded interview, June 26, 2004.
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the Halaqah. Hizb ut-Tahrir describes this activity as an intellectual
exercise, but as a political movement, they seek social change and this
requires ideologically trained activists. The Halaqah is the central
instrument employed to inculcate HT ideology. As Passmore declares,
radicalization is a “special form of drilling in,” which in the case of HT
entails ‘drilling’ HT ideology within the novice.69
The function of the Halaqah is to inculcate the novice with HT ideology.
Initially, this entails engineering a new cognitive outlook. The Halaqah as
a change agent is a life-long technique employed by HT to reinforce HT
ideology for the entire lifespan of the novice. However, the Halaqah does
not end with membership, as all activists perpetually receive weekly
Halaqah. This prolonged radicalization method allows the novice to
navigate the paradoxes of the outside world. As the novice re-enters
society, they encounter ideas that challenge their newly adopted ideology.
Attending the weekly Halaqah allows the novice to align their social
experiences with HT ideology, providing the novice with a constant point
of reference.
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